SITUATION II: VISIT AND SEARCH by unknown
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. Government, 
the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College. 
 
International Law Studies—Volume 27 
International Law Situations 
 
SITUATION II 
VISIT AND SEARCH 
NoTE.-In this situation it is granted that the vessels. have a 
legal right to fly the flags 1nentioned and that all states conform 
in their actions to the rules of international law. 
States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral. 
A small torpedo boat of X meets a large passenger liner 
bound for a port of Y and known to be privately owned 
by a company of Z and flying the flag o£ Z. T_he com-
Blander of the torpedo boat can not search the hner nor 
spare a prize crew, and his duties do not permit him to 
escort the liner into port. He suspects there may be 
some contraband on board and signals · the liner to go 
to a named port of X for search. The liner sails away 
and goes to the port of Y and is subsequently 1net on 
the high sea by the same torpedo boat. 
What is the liability of the liner of Z? 
SOLUTION 
Under existing international law the moYements 6£ 
neutral vessels on the high sea are subject to belligerent 
direction only when under belligerent control by a prize 
crew or escorting vessel and the liner has incurred no 
liability. 
NOTES 
Naval War College discussions.-The subject o£ visit 
and search has naturally received much consideration at 
this Naval War College. Certain aspects of the subject 
received extended consideration in 1905 (1905. N. W. C. 
International Law Topics, 48-61), and less extended 
discussions have been carried on at other times, while 
frequent references to visit and search have been n1ade 
in other discussions. The conduct o£ visit and search 
has, however, been particularly prominent in relation to 
43 
44 VISIT AND SEARCH 
other' practices in consequence of events 1n the \Vorld 
War, 1914-1918. 
Early understavnding.-In a report of the British law 
officers in 1753 the la'v of capture with other matters 
relating thereto 'yas discussed: 
When two po\vers are at war, they have a right to make prizes 
of ships, goods, and effects of each other upon the high seas; 
whatever is the property of the enemy may be acquired by capture 
at sea; but the propert~ of a friend can not be taken, provided he 
observed his neutrality. 
Hence the la\v of nations has established: 
That the goods of an enemy on board the ship of a friend 1nay 
be tal~en . 
. That the lawful goods of a friend on board the ship of an ~nemy 
ought to be restored. 
That contraband goods going to the ene1ny, though the property 
of a friend, may be taken as prize, because supplying the enemy 
with what enables him better to carry on the war is a departure 
frmn neutrality. 
By the maritime law of nations universally and immemorially 
rec:eived, there is an established method of determination whether 
the capture be, or be not, lawful prize. , 
Before the ship or goods can be disposed of by the captor, there 
must be a regular judicial proceeding, wherein both parties may 
be heard, and conde1nnation thereupon as prize in a court of 
achniralty, judging by the law of nations and treaties. 
The proper and regular court for these condemnations is the 
court of that State to whom the captor belongs. 
The evidence to acquit or condemn, with or without costs or 
damages, must, in the first instance, come merely from the ship 
taken, viz, the papers on board, and the examination on oath of 
the master and other principal officers ; for which purpose there 
are officers of Admiralty in all considerable sea ports of every 
Inaritime power at war, to examine the captains and other prin-
cipal officers of every ship brought in as prize, upon general and 
impartial interrogatories. If there do not appear from thence 
ground to condemn as enemy's property, or contraband goods 
going to the enemy, there must be an acquittal; unless from the 
aforesaid evidence the property shall appear so doubtful, that it is. 
reasonable to go into further proof thereof. (2 Marsden, Laws 
and Custmn of the Sea, p. 350.) 
The "Zavrnora," 1916.-~ This case, which was very fully 
argued and upon which a long opinion was given, went 
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on appeal to the judicial con1mittee of the privy council. 
In the opinion Lord Parker, of vVaddington, said: 
It was suggested in argu1nent that a vessel brought into harbor 
for search might, before seizure, be requisitioned under the 
1nunicipal law. This point, if it ever arises, would fall to be 
decided by a court administering 1nunicipal law, but from the 
point of view of international law it \VOuld be a misfortune if 
the practice of bringing a vessel into harbor for the purpose 
of search-a practice which is justifiable because search at sea 
is impossible under the conditions of modern warfare-were 
held to give rise to rights which could not arise if the search 
took place at sea. ( [1916] 2 A. C. 77; see also 1922 N. ,Y. C. 
Int. Law Decisions, p. 126.) 
Case of the " lJf aria," 17.99.-The case of the Maria., 
decided by Sir William Scott in 1799, became almost 
-classic as stating the British position on visit and search, 
In the beginning Sir William says : 
I state a few principles of that system of law which I take to 
be incontrovertible. 
1st, That the right of visiting and searching 1nerchant ships 
-upon the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the 
cargoes, whatever be the destinations, is an incontestible right 
·of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation. 
I say, be the ships, the cargoes, and the destinations what they 
may, because, till they are visited and searched, it does not 
appear what the ships, or the cargoes, or the destinations are; 
and it is for the purpose of ascertaining these points that the 
necessity of this r~ght of visitation and search exists. This 
right is so clear in principle, that no man can deny it who admits 
the legality of maritime capture; because if you are not at 
liberty to ascertain by sufficient inquiry whether there is prop-
erty that can legally be captured, it is hnpossible to capture. 
Even those who contend for the inadmissible rule, that free ships 
'Jnake free goods, must admit the exercise of this right at least 
-for the purpose of ascertaining whether the ships are free ships 
·or not. The right is equally clear in practice ; for practice is 
uniform and universal upon the subject. * * * The right 
must unquestionably be exercised with as little of personal harsh-
ness and of vexation in the mode as possible; but soften it as 
much as you can, it is still a right of force, though of lawful 
force-something in the nature of civil process, where force is 
employea. but a lawful force \vhich cannot lawfully be i·esisted. 
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For it is a wild conceit that wherever force is used, it may be 
forcibly resisted; a lawful force cannot lawfully be resisted. 
The only case where it can be so in matter of this nature, is 
in the state of war and conflict between two countries, where 
one party has a perfect right to attack by force, and the other 
has an equall~r perfect right to repel by force. But in the 
relative situation of two countries at peace with each other, 
no such conflicting rights can possibly coexist. (1 C. Rob. Ad-
Iniralty Reports, p. 340.) 
After a considerable discussion of. convoy the judg-
Inent speaks of bringing vessels in for further inquiry 
than can be n1ade at sea. 
Thirdly; another right accrued, that of bringing in for a more 
deliberate inquiry than could possibly be conducted at sea upon 
such a number of vessels, even those which professed to carry 
cargoes with a neutral destination. * * * 
I take the rule of law to be, that the vessel shall submit to 
the inquiry proposed, looking with confidence to those tribunals 
whose noblest office (and I hope not the least acceptable to 
them ) is to relieYe, by compensation, inconveniences of this kind, 
where they have happened through accident or error; and to 
redress, by compensation and punishment, injuries that have 
been committed by design. (Ibid.) 
Brirrging seized vesselS' to port.-Domestic legislation 
(United States Revised Statutes, sees. 4615, 4617) and 
international regulation (Institute of International La\V, 
1913, art. 103) and 1nany national regulations (Russian,, 
1895, art. 22; Italy, 1915, art. 11; German ordinance, 1909,. 
art. 111) provide for bringing seized vessels to port. 
These all in1ply that, either in charge of a prize cre\v or 
under escort, the vessel \Yhich has by visit and search at, 
sea been found liable to suspicion of acts which \Yould 
1nake it subject to prize-court procedure should ren1ain 
under the control of the belligerent until delivered to the· 
prize court. X one of these regulations provide for send-
ing in a neutral Inerchant vessel in order that the search 
for evidence shall be made in port, though if suspicion 
exists or is aroused at the point of visit and search at 
sea it \Vould be justifia~le to send the vessel to port for 
further investigation or for confir1natory evidence. 
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Resolution of the Institute of I nternationaZ Law, 
1913.-ln the Oxford Manual of Naval War, drawn up 
and approved by the institute at its Oxford meeting in 
1913, articles 32 and 100 give the general principles in 
regard to visit and search and seizure. These resolutions 
have been translated as follows: 
ARTICLE 32. Public and private vessels-StoppinifJ, visit, and 
search. All vessels other than those of the navy, whether they 
belong to the State or to individuals, may be summoned by a 
belligerent warship to stop that a visit and search may be con-
ducted on board the1n. 
The belligerent warship, in ordering a vessel to stop, shall 
fire a charge of powder as a summons and, if that warning is not 
sufficient, shall fire a projectile across the bow of the vessel. 
Previously or at the same time, the warship shall hoist its flag, 
above which at night, a signal light shall be placed. The vessel 
answers the signal by hoisting its own flag and by stopping at 
once; whereupon, the warship shall send to the stopped vessel a 
launch manned by an officer and a sufficient nu1nber of men, of 
\YhOin only two or three shall accompany the officer on board the 
stopped vessel. 
Visit consists in the first place in an examination of the ship's 
papers. 
If the ship's papers are insufficient or not of a nature to allay 
suspicion, the officer conducting the visit has the right to proceed 
to a search of the vessel, for which purpose he must ask the 
cooperation of the captain. 
Visit of post packets must, as Article 53 says, be conducted with 
all the consideration and all the expedition possible. 
Vessels convoyed by a neutral warship are not subject to visit 
except in so far as permitted by the rules relating to convoys. 
ARTICLE 100. Forr~nalities of sei,zure. \Vhen, after the search 
has been conducted, the vessel is considered subject to capture, 
the officer who seizes the ship must: 
1. Seal all the ship's papers after having inventoried them; 
2. Draw up a report of the seizure, as well as a short inven-
tory of the vessel, stating its condition; 
3. State the condition of the: cargo which he has inventoried, 
then close the hatchways of the hold, the chests, and the store-
romn and, as far as circtnnstances will permit, seal them; 
4. Draw up a list of the persons found on board; 
5. Put on board t11e seized vessel a crew sufficient to retain 
possession of it, n1aintain order upon it, and conduct it to such 
port as he may see fit. 
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If he thinks fit, the captain n1ay, instead of sending a crew 
aboard a vessel, confine himself to escorting it. (Resolutions of 
the Institute of International Law, Scott, Carnegie Endowment, 
-pp. 181, 197. ) 
0 hanging conditions of 1narit~11~e war .-A common con-
tention is that the change in tonnage, the use of stean1, 
the introduction of undersea craft, and other recent modi-
fications in sea transportation have rendered early Inari-
tiine la,vs inoperative. That the 1nanner of application 
·of a lavv may be modified through such changes is usually 
admitted,, but that the principle, of the la'v is no longer 
applicable may at the same time be denied. During the 
'-'Tor ld War the character of vessels of 'var and merchant 
Yessels varied more 'videly than in any previous vvar. 
'There were changes in tonnage, speed, stability, Inethod 
of propulsion, use of subsurface craft, and the like. One 
group maintained that as corresponding changes had been 
made or n1igh t be made both in the ol)e and the other type 
·OI craft the belligerent could not justly contend that the 
same principles did not apply in the relations of its ves-
sels of 'var to neutral vessels as applied in earlier 'vars. 
The fact that one type of belligerent vessel of vvar 'vas 
relatively 'veaker than a merchant vessel did not give it 
special exceptional belligerent rights as regards a neutral 
vessel, nor did the fact that another type of vessel of vvar 
might find it particularly hazardous to act in a manner 
:formerly sanctioned by the la'v of 'var give the belliger-
·ent the right to enunciate new principles of law. During 
the World War it 'vas from time to time. affirmed by the 
belligerents that the firm intent 'vas to follo'v in their 
prize courts accepted internationallavv. 
Statement of Britisl~ attorney gener1al, 1917.-Sir Fred-
erick Smith in 1917, while Bri.tish attorney general, 
after reviewing conventions and practice said : 
From these considerations it follows that the commander of 
a belligerent warship may not dispense with the practice of visit 
.and search in regard to suspected or~ ene1ny merchantmen. It 
is his duty, before resorting to forcible mea~ures, to aSC(~rtain the 
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true character of the vessel, the nationality of the passengers 
and crew on board, and the nature and destination of the cargo. 
(The Destruction of Merchant Ships under International Law, 
p. 16.) 
It is inevitable that in maritime warfare bell.igerent 
interests may conflict with neutral interests. The rela-
tions between these interests have gradually become de-
fined and at the beginning of the-World War were con-
sidered fairly established. Of this the attorney general 
said: , 
'Vhen, in naval warfare, the interests of belligerents come into 
conflict with those of neutrals, it does not follow, under the ex-
isting law of nations, that the former predominate over the latter. 
Neutrals have the right to sail the high seas; they are entitled 
to use this international highway unmolested, as long as they 
observe the clearly defined obligations of neutrality. Belliger-
ents' convenience may not override neutral rights. Indeed, it 
may be argued in accordance with the fundamental principles 
of jurisprudence applicable to the society of states that, as war 
is from the point of view of international law an abnormal con-
dition, the right of neutrals to use the high seas and carry on 
their legitilnate commerce e-ren prevails over the claims of belliger-
ents to make use of this or that portion of the open sea for the 
purposes of their conflict. So long as neutral vessels do not 
encroach within the· limited theatre of warlike operations, so long 
as they commit no violation of the rules of neutrality, for ex-
ample, as to blockade running, contraband trading, or unneutral 
service, they are entitled to be left alone, subject, of course, to 
visit and search in case of suspicion. The observance of their 
obligations necessarily implies the enjoyment of relative rights 
on their part, and a corresponding imposition of indefeasible 
obligations on belligerents. (Ibid. p. 73.) 
J. A. Hall's opinion, 19B1.-Referring to the F'rench 
co1nn1ent on the place of search, J. A. Hall says : 
Except that the last paragraph might imply that the 1nere fact 
of being in the zone of hostilities is by itself a matter of sus-
picion sufficient to justify the vessel being diverted for search in 
port, 'Which in smne geographical circumstances could scarcely 
be reasonable, the de<;laration by the French l\1inistry of Marine 
seems a very fair statement of what the modern right of visit 
and search should be. Apart altogether from the special cir-
cumstances of the Great War arising out of Germany's illegal 
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practices at sea, the following permanent reasons for this <Ievelop-
ment of the right ' seem to afford it fun justification: 
1. The ship's papers in these days, when telegraphs and other 
.1neans of rapid communication are available for merchants, 
need afford no reliable indication of the destin~tion of the cargo. 
2. The destination of the vessel owing to railways and other 
modern means of' land transport is no criterion of the destination 
·'Of the cargo. 
3. The ship's officers may be equally ignorant on this point. 
4. Modern means of communication, while reducing the value 
·of evidence from the ship, has enormously increased the PO\vers 
of a belligerent govern1nent to obtain inforn1ation fron1 the 
Yessel's port of departure and pass on instructions to its exam-
-ining cruisers. 
5. The size of modern n1erchant ships enables then1 to keep at 
sea when weather conditions make even visiting them impossible. 
6. The necessary extension of contraband to cover articles of 
s1nall bulk but of great value for war, together with the huge 
-cargo capacity of modern ships, has made concealment easy and 
a n adequate examination of such cargo at sea impossible. 
Neutral commerce must always inevitably suffer inconvenience 
f ro1n the exercise of belligerent rights , in tin1e of war. If these 
r ights are to be retained, they must be capable of effective use 
a nd adaptable to modern conditions, for as Lord Stowell truly 
remarked, " If you are not at liberty to ascertain by sufficient 
·enquiry whether there is property that can be legally captured, 
it is impossible to capture," and diversion into port or other 
s uitable waters for search is not unduly hard upon neutrals if 
exercised vvith proper safeguards against abuse. In the first 
place the spot selected for search must not involve an unreason-
a ble deviation of the vessel fro1n her voyage. In the second 
place, it seems perfectly clear that nothing in international law 
can justify diversion merely in the hope of discovering by subse-
q uent search evidence of contraband or other noxious trading; 
there must be some substantial ground, no matter frmn what 
source it is derived, for suspecting that this particular vessel 
is engaged in such trade, although the evidence may not at the 
n1oment be sufficient to support a plea for condemnation in the 
prize court. Given these two conditions diversion should be 
permissible in all cases where the weather makes a visit im-
p ossible, or where the visit and such search as is possible at sea 
does nothing to dispel the suspicions already reasonably deduced 
fro1n information from external sources. And finally, the neu-
t ral owners affected must be able to obtain damages fro1n the 
bf~lligerent !or losses arising from unreasonable diversion or from 
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.unreasonable delay in carrying out the search ancl in releasing 
the vessel or cargo or bringing them before the prize court. 
(Law of Naval "\Varfare, 2d eel., p. 266.) 
Visit and search before 1915.-While fron1 the d~vel­
··opment of law of maritime 'varfare vis1t and search has 
been approved, the general rule had been that reason for 
.seizure should be evident at the place where the merchant 
vessel 'vas stopped. The preliminary inspection of the 
~ship's papers or other circumstances then kno'\vn might 
furnish grounds for suspicion. Leslie Scott and Alex-
.a.nder Shaw presented the British vie'v in 1915: 
In short the right of search is a clearly established principle of 
international Law· and the points of criticisn1 which have arisen 
.are le·n:·lled not against the right of search itself, but against the 
particular method in which it has s01netimes been exercised. The 
·main criticism of Great Britain's present and recent action is that 
.neutral ships have been taken into port to be searched. This is 
~poken of by some as if it were a new departure. We· propose to 
show in the first place that this 1nethod of exercising the right 
-of search is by no means without ample precedent; and then to 
·discuss the modern conditions. of co1n1nerce and of warfare which 
.have made this particular method of exercising the right impera-
tive, and the means which have been taken to render this method 
.as little onerous as may be to the neutr.al interests concerned. 
I. It is plain that no belligerent can abandon the right of 
:Search; it is clear also that it is of the essence of the right that it 
shall be effective·. The principle at stake is the right to make an 
.effectiYe investigation into the character, ownership and destina-
tion of cargoes. That principle is unchallenged and remains. No 
nation will e·ver, or can ever, abandon it. To do so would be 
suicidal. At the worst any changes in this respect which are 
·charged against the British Government are changes not of prin-
·Ciple but changes of method necessary to preserve the principle. 
It is interesting, however, to note that what is spoken of as a 
new departure by Great Britain-the taking of vessels into port 
for search-is really a hoary and time-hallowed way of exercising 
the right. So long ago as 1808 Lord Ellenborough in the case of 
Barker v. Blakes (9• East .at p. 292) treated the taking of vessels 
into port as a well recognized and established custom. " The 
American" the report of his judgment reads "was at liberty to 
pursue his commerce with France and to be· the carrier of 'goods 
for French subjects; at the risk indeed of having his voyage inter-
cepted by the goods being seized ; or of the vessel itself, on board 
52 VISIT AND SEARCH 
• 
which they were being detained or brought into British ports for 
the purpose of search.!' 
It is not surprising to find that the obvious convenience of 
search in a port, even in days before it was so necessary as at the 
present time, led belligerents to adopt this method. 
As was pointed out by Sir Edward Grey in his communication 
of the lOth February to the American Government. "The present 
conflict is not the first in which this nec-essity has arisen: as long 
ago as the CiYil 'Var the United States found it necessary to take 
Yessels into the United States ports in order to determine whether 
the circumstances justified their detention." Sir Edward Grey 
also pointed out that the same need .arose during the Russo-
Japanese 'Var and also during the second Balkan 'Var when 
British yessels were compelled to follow cruisers to some spot 
where the right of sea'rch could be more conveniently carried 
out, and that this was ultimately acquiesced in by the British 
GoYerinnent. 
It is clear then that Great Britain has not done anything 
unprecedented,_ and a consideration of the conditions of modern 
commerce and of Inodern naval warfare makes it clear that 
the action of Great Britain in taking vessels. to port for search 
is bound, in the nature of things, to be adopted more and more 
• widely in future if the right of search is to be preserved at 
all. (Great Britain and Neutral Commerce, p. 4.) 
It is true that prior to the 'IV orld War vessels \Vere 
taken into port for further search \Vhen suspicion justi-
fied such action but there could not be said to be any 
right to take a Yessel into port for search in absence of 
suspicion. Indeed in the case of Barker v. BlalJ:,es, to 
\Yhich reference is 1nade, there \Vas no ground for dra\v-
ing the S\Yeeping generalization in regard to practice of-
Yisit and search. The a\vard of the judges constituting 
the Perinanent Court of Arbitration in the ca~e of the-
e art ha.ge sho-ws the existing la \V in the pre-\Var period. 
The ease of the " Carthage," 191cg.-The :facts o:f this 
case as stated by the tribunal were as follo,vs: 
The French mail stean1er Carthage, of the Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, in the course of a regular voyage between Mar-
seilles and Tnnis, \Yas stopped on January 16, 1912, at 6: 30 A. l\1., 
tn the open sea, 17 1niles frmn the coast of Sardinia, by the tor-
pedo destroyer Agordat of the Royal Italian Navy. 
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The comn1ander of the Agordat, having ascertained the presence 
on board the Carthage of an aeroplane belonging to one 1Duval, 
a French aviator, and consigned to his address at Tunis, declared 
to the captain of the Carthage that the aeroplane in question 
was considered by the Italian Government contraband of war. 
As the transshipment of the aeroplane could not be made, the 
captain of the Carthage received the order to follow the Agordat 
to Oagliari, where he was detained until January 20. (Wilson, 
·.rhe Hague Arbitration Oases, p. 363.) 
France and Italy, differing as to the rights of the 
parties in the case, agreed to submit the follo·wing ques-
tion to the Permanent Court o£ Arbitration at The 
Hague: 
1. Were the Italian naval authorities within their rights in 
proceeding as they did to the capture and temporary seizure of 
the French mail steamer Carthage? (Ibid. p. '353.) 
The Tribunal in its award stated: 
According to the principles universally acknowledged, a bellig-
erent ship of war has, as a general rule and except for special 
circumstances, the right to stop in the open sea a neutral com-
mercial vessel and to proceed to visit and search it to assure him-
self whether it is observing the rules of neutrality, especially 
\ 
as to contraband. 
On the other hand, the legality of every act going beyond the 
limits of visit and search depends upon the existence either of 
contraband trade or of sufficient reasons to believe that there is 
such. * * * 
The information possessed by the Italian authorities was of too 
general a nature and had too little connection with the aeroplane 
in question to constitute sufficient juridical reasons to believe iii 
any hostile destination whatever and, consequently, to justify the 
cap~ure of the vessel which was transporting the aeroplane. 
(Ibid. p. 365.) 
After further statement o£ arguments, the tribunal 
de.clared and pronounced that : 
The Italia;n n(JJI)al authoriti.es were not with·in their rights in 
proceeding, as they did, to the capture a;nd te·mporary sei-z1u·e of 
the French mail steamer "Carthage." 
American-Britw.h emchamge of notes, 1914-15.-A,lmost 
at the beginning of the World War differences arose as 
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to the method of exercise of the right of visit and search .. 
Many notes were exchanged between belligerents and 
neutrals. In a note of December 26, 1914, to the Ameri- -
can ambassador in London the Secretary of State said: . 
The Gover:innent of the United Sta~es readily ad1nits the full 
right of a belligerent to visit and search on the high seas the -
vessels of American citizens or other neutral vessels carrying -
American goods and to detain them when there is sufficient evi- -
dence to jtltstify a belief that contraband at:ticles are in tlte·ir · 
oar goes; but His lVIajesty's Government, judging by their own 
experience in the past, must realize that this Government can. 
not without protest pennit American ships or American cargoes 
to be taken 'into British ports and there detained for the purpose 
of searching generally for evidence of contraband, or upon pre-
sumptions created by special n1unicipal enactments which are-
clearly at variance \Vith international law and practice. (9" 
Special Suppleinent, A. J. I. L., July, 1915, p. 58.) 
The Secretary of State expressed the opinion that 
observance of accepted law ·would better serve belliger- · 
ents and neutrals, and that a continuance of the British_ 
practices might" arouse a feeling contrary to that which .. 
has so long existed bet,veen the American and British~ 
peoples." 
In replying to this note on January 7, 1915, Sir~ 
Ed,vard Grey said: 
It is, however, essential under modern conditions that where· 
there is real gro.und for suspecting the presence of contraband, 
the vessels should be brought into port for examination; in no .. 
other way can the right of search be exercised, and but for this : 
practice it would have to be con1pletely abandoned. (Ibid. p. 63.) 
This note gave an extended argument of the compara- -
tive shipments of goods to different countries before and 
after the war, the implication being that such incr·ease-
in shipments was strong presumption of_ belligerent des- · 
tination. In a further reply of February 10, 1915, the · 
argument was elaborated, and it was stated: 
The opportunities now enjoyed by a belligerent for obtaining -
supplies through neutral ports are far ~reater than they were -
fifty years ago, and the geographical conditions of the present -
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.5truggle lend additional assistance to the ene1ny in carrying out 
such importation. We are faced with the problem of intercepting_ 
such supplies when arranged with all the advantages that flow 
frmu elaborate organization and unstinted expenditure. If our 
belligerent rights are to be maintained, it is of the first impor-
tance for us to distingui~h between what is really bona fide trade--
intended for the neutral country concerned and the trade intended 
for the eneniy country. Every effort is made by organizers of 
this trade to conceal the true destination, and if the innocent 
neutral trade is to be distinguished fron1 the enemy trade it is . 
essential that Ins J\1:ajesty's Government should be entitled t<>-
n1ake, and should make, careful enquiry with regard to the des-
tination of particular shipments of goods even at the risk of some 
sliglrt delay to the parties interested. If such enqujries were not 
made, either the exercise of our be-lligerent rights would have to .. 
be abandoned, tending to the prolongation of this war and the in-
crease of the loss and suffering which it is entailing upon the-
lvhole world, or else it would be necessary to indulge in indis-
criminate captures of neutral goods and their detention through · 
out all the period of the resulting prize court proceedings. Under · 
the system no'v adopted it has been found possible to release with-
out delay, and consequently without appreciable loss to the parties 
interested, all the goods of which the destination is shown as the---, 
result of the enquiries to be innocent. 
It may well be that the system of making such enquiries is to a-_ 
certain extent a new introduction, in that it has been practised 
to a far greater extent than in previous wars; but if it is cor-
rectly described as a new departure, it is a departure which is·. 
wholly to the advantage of neutrals, and which has been made for:. 
the purpose of relieving them so far as possible from loss and 
inconvenience. (Ibid. p. 73.) 
-This note maintained that there were precedents for-
the British practice in the records of the United States 
and other states. It al~o referred to the note of the 
United States of November 7, 1914, in which it was said ~-
In the opinion of this Government, the belligerent right of visit 
and search requires that the search should be made on the high 
seas at the time of the visit, and that the conclusion of the search. 
should rest upon the evidence found on the ship under investiga-
tion and not upon circumstances ascertained from external _ 
sources. (Ibid. p. 7 4.) 
The British contention wa.s that this was inconsistent· .. 
·with practice and with the decision of the Supreme Court: 
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of the United States in the case of the Ber1nuda. Never-
theless the British note continues: 
It is not impossible that the course of the present struggle 
will show the necessity for belligerent action to be taken in 
various ways which may at first sight be regarded as a de-
parture from old practice. (Ibid. p. 75.) 
In further support of the tendencies toward pew prac-
tices it maintains: 
No Power during· these days can afford during a great war to 
forego the, exercise of the right of visit and search. Vessels 
which are apparently har1nless 1nerchantmen can be used for 
carrying and l~ying 1nines and even fitted to discharge torpedoes. 
Supplies for submarines can without difficulty be concealed under 
other cargo. The only protection against these risks is to visit 
and search thoroughly every vessel appearing in the zone of 
operations, and if the circumstances are such as to render it im-
possible to carry it out at the spot where the vessel was met 
with the only practicable course is to t~ke the ship to some n1ore 
convenient locality for the pu1;pose. To so do is not to be looked 
upon as a new belligerent right, but as an adaptation of the 
existing right to the modern conditions of co1n1nerce. Like all 
belligerent rights, it 1nust be exercised with due regard for 
neutral interests, and it would be unreasonable to expect .a neutral 
vessel to make long deviations from her course for this purpose. 
It is for this reason that we have done all we can do to encourage 
neutral 1nerchantmen on their way to ports contiguous to the 
enemy country to visit some British port lying on their line of 
route in order that the necessary examination of the ship's papers, 
and, if required, of the cargo, can be made under conditions of 
convenience _to the ship herself. The alternative w.ould be to keep 
a ves~el which the naval officers desired to board waiting, it 
might be for days together, until the weather conditions enabled 
the visit to be carried out at sea. (Ibid. p. 76.) 
This note of February 10, 1915, embodies many other 
statements 'vhich might give rise to questions such as': 
The principle that the burden of proof should always be 
imposed upon the captor has usually been admitted as a theory. 
In practice, however, it has allnost been always otherwise, and 
any student of the prize courts decisions of the past or even of 
1nodern wars will find that goods seldom escape condemnation 
unless their owner was in a position to prove that their destina· 
tion was innocent. (Ibid. p. 78.) 
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War zon1e proclamation, February 4, 1915.-The Ger-
rnan proclamation of February 4, 1915, declaring that 
as from February 19, in the waters surrounding Great 
Britain and Ireland every enemy merchant ship " will 
be destroyed without its being always possible to avert 
the dangers threatening the crews and passengers on 
that account," shifted attention for a time to German 
practices and the Secretary of State o£ the United States 
in a communication to the German Government said : 
It is of course not necessary to remin.d the Gennan Govern-
ment that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral 
vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless 
a blockade is proclahned and effectively maintained, which this 
Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. 
To declare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel 
entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly 
determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband char-
acter of its cargo would be a~ act so unprecedented in naval 
warfare that tnis Government is reluctant to believe that the 
Imperial Government of Germany in this case contemplates it 
as possible. The suspiCion that ene1ny ships are using neutral 
flags hnproperly can create no just presumption that all ships 
traversing a prescribed area are subject to the same suspicion. 
It is to detennine exactly such questions that this Govern1nent 
understands the right of visit and search to have been recog-
nizeq. (Ibid. p. 86.) 
Acts based upon the plea of retaliation in disregard of 
accepted laws of maritime war followed and arguments 
varying in ·weight were presented by all parties. On this 
situation on-- March 30, 1915, the Secretary of State writes 
to the American ambassador at London/ for transmission 
to the British Government: 
A. belligerent nation has been conceded the right of visit and 
search, and the right of capture and condemnation, if upon 
examination a neutral vessel is found to be engaged in unneutral 
service or to be carrying contraband of war intended for the 
enemy's government or armed forces. It has been conceded the 
right to establish and maintain a blockade of an enemy's ports 
and coasts and to c'apture and condemn any vessel taken in 
trying to break the blockade. It is even conceded the right to de-
1802,-29L--5 
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tain and take to its own ports for judicial examination all 
vessels which it suspects for substantial reasons to be engaged 
in unneutral or contraband service and to condemn them if the 
suspicion is sustained. But such rights, long clearly defined 
both in doctrine and practice, have hitherto been held to be the 
only permissible exceptions to the principle of universal equality 
of sovereignty on the high seas as between belligerents and 
nations not engaged in 'var. (Ibid. p. 117.) 
Note of Sir Edw~ard Grey, 1915.-ln a· note of July 31, 
1915, Sir Edward Grey quotes with approval the :follow-
ing from Sir Samuel Evans's recent decision in the 
British prize court in .the case of the Zamora.· 
I make bold to express the hope and belief that the nations of 
the world need not be apprehensive that Orders in Council will 
emanate from the Government of this country in such violation of 
the acknowledged laws of nations that it is conceivable that our 
prize tribunals, holding the law of nations in reverence, would 
feel called upon to disregard and refuse obedience to the pro-
visions of such orders. 
Sir Edward Grey in the same note further says: 
In the note which I handed to Your Excellency on the 24d 
July, I endeavoured to convince the Government of the United 
States, and I trust with success, that the measures that we have 
felt ourselves compelled to adopt, in consequence of the numer-
ous acts committed by our enemies in violation of the law of 
war and the dictates of humanity, are consistent with the prin-
ciples of international law. (9 Special Supplement, A. J. I. L., 
July, 1915, p. 164.) 
Americ({JJ1j-British notes, Ootobevr 21, 1915, April '24, 
19J.6.-The American and British positions in regard to 
visit and search were most :fully set :forth in the long notes 
of October 21, 1915, and April 24, 1916. 
In the American note o:f October 21, 1915, the Secre-
tary of State expresses his regret that the hope based 
upon assurances of the allied Governments that the meas-
ures taken by them would "not infringe unjustifiably 
upon the neutral right of American citizens engaged in 
trade and commerce " had not been realized. The Secre-
tary of State then enumerated certain conditions which 
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aroused his apprehensions o£ even greater dangers to 
American rights. 
'_fhe method o:£ visit and search received particular 
attention and was quite :fully treated in this note. The 
Secretary o£ State said: 
(3) First. The detentions of American vessels and cargoes 
which have taken place since the opening of hostilities have, it is 
presumed, been pursuant to the enforcement of the Orders in 
Council, which were issued on August 20 and October 29, 1914, 
and March 11, 1915, and relate to contraband traffic and to the 
interception of trade to and fr01n Gern1a11y and Austria-Hungary. 
In practice· these detentions have not been unifonnly based on 
proofs obtained at the time of seizure, but 1nany vessels hav·e 
been detained while sf'arch was made for evidence of the contra-
band character of cargoes or of an intention to evade' the non-
intercourse me·asures of Great Britain. The question, conse-
quently, has been one of evidence to support a belief of-in 1nany 
eases a bare suspicion of-enemy destination, or occasionalJ y of 
enemy origin of the goods involved. 'Vhether this evidence 
should be obtained by search at sea before the vessel or cargo is 
taken into port, and what the character of the evidence should be, 
which is necessary to justify the detention, are the points to 
which I direct Your Excellency's attention" 
( 4) In regard to search at sea, an examination of the instruc-
tions issued to naval com1nanders of the United. States, Great 
Britain, Russia, Japan, Spain, Germany, and France from 1888 
to the beginning of the present war shows that search in port 
was not contemplated by the Government of any of these coun-
tries. On the contrary, the context of the respective instructions 
show that search at sea was the procedure expected to be fol-
lowed by the commanders. All of' these instructions impress 
upon the naval officers the necessity of acting with the utmost 
moderation-and in some cases c01nmanclers are specifically in-
structed-in exercising the right of visit and search, to avoid 
undue deviation of the vessel from her course. 
(5) An examination of the opinions of the most eminent text 
writers on the laws of nations shows that they give practically 
no consideration to the question of search in port, outside of 
examination in the course of regular prize court proceedings. 
(6) The assertion by His Majesty's Government that the posi-
tion of the United S.tates in relation to search at sea is incon-
sistent with its practice during the A1nerican Civil War is' based 
upon a misconception. Irregularities there n1ay have been at the 
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beginning of that war, but a careful search of the records of this 
Govenunent as to the practice of its commanders shows con-
clusively that there were no instances when vessels were brought 
into port for search prior to instituting prize court proceedings, 
or that captures were 1nade upon other grounds than, in the 
words of the An1erican note of' November 7, 1914, "evidence 
.folJ.nd on the ship pncler investigation and not upon circumstances 
ascertained frmn external sources." A copy· of the instruction 
.issued to American naval officers on August 18, 1862, for their 
guidance during the Civil War, is appended. 
( 7) The British contention that " modern conditions " justify 
bringing vessels into 110rt for search is based upon the size, the 
.seaworthiness of modern carriers of c01nmerce, and the difficulty 
of nncovering the real transaction in the intricate trade opera-
tions of the present day. It is believed that commercial trans-
actions of the present tilne, han1pered as they are by censorship 
of telegraph and postal cornn1unication on the part of belligerents, 
.are essentially no more complex and disguised than in the wars of 
recent years, during which the practice of obtaining evidence 
.in port to determine \Vhether ·a vessel should be held for prize 
J)roceedings was not adopted. The effect of the size and sea-
'vorthiness of' merchant vessels upon their search at sea has been 
subn1itted to a board of naval experts, which reports that: 
"At no period in history has it been considered necessary to 
. re1nove every package of a ship's cargo to establish the character 
and nature of her trade or the service on which she is bound, 
nor is such removal necessary. * * * 
"-The facilities for boarding and inspection of modern ships 
are in fact greater than in former times, and no difference, so 
far as the ne~essities of the case are concerned, can be seen 
between the search of a ship of a thousand tons and one of 
twenty thousand tons-except possibly a difference in time-for 
the purpose of establishing fully the character of her cargo and 
the nature of her service and destination. * * * This method 
;'vould . be a direct aid to the belligerents concerned in that it 
\vould release a belligerent vessel overhauling the neutral from 
its duty of search and set it free for further belligerent opera-
tions." (10 Special Supplen1ent, A.· J. I. L., Oct. 1916, p. 74.) 
Th.e British reply, six months later, April 24, 1916, 1s 
so important that it deserves consideration. 
. 4. The question whether the exercise ·of the right of search can 
.be restricted to search at sea was dealt with in Sir E. Grey's 
note of the 7th January, 1915, and His Majesty's Government 
would again draw attention to the facts that information has 
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constantly reached them Qf attempts to conceal contraband -in-
tended for the enemy in innocent packages1 and that these atte1npts 
can only be frustrated by exan1ination of the ship and cargo in , 
port. Similarly, in Sir E. Grey's note of the 10th February, 1915, 
it was pointed out that the size of mode·rn steamships, and tpeir 
capacity to navigate the waters where the allied patrols have to 
operate, whatever the conditions of the weather, frequently ren-
der it a matter of extreme danger, if not of impossibility, even 
to board the vessels unless' the·y are taken into calm water 1 for 
the purpose. It is unnecessary to repeat what was said in that 
note. There is nothing that His l\Iajesty's Governn1ent could 
withdraw or that the experience· of the officers of the allied fleets 
has tended to show was inaccurate. 
5. When visit and search at sea are possible, and when a search 
can be made there· which is sufficient to secure belligerent 
rights, it may be· admitted that it would be an unreasonable hard-
ship on merchant vessels to compel them to c01ne into port, and it 
n1ay well be believed that maritin1e nations have hesitated to 
modify the instructions to their naval officers that it is at sea 
that these operations should be carried out, and that undue 
deviation of the vessel from her course must be avoided. That, 
however, does not affect the fact that it would be impossible. 
under the conditions of modern warfare to confine the rights of 
visit and search to an exan1:nation of the ship at the place where 
she is encountered ·without surrendering a fund~mental belligerent 
right. . 
6. The effect of the size and seaworthiness of 1nerchant vessels. 
upon their search at sea is essentially a technical question, and 
accordingly His Majesty's Governn1ent have thought it well to 
subm ·t the report of the board of naval experts, quoted by the 
United States Ambassador in paragraph 7 of this note, to Admiral 
Sir John Jellicoe for his observations. The unique expe-rience 
which this officer has gained as the result of more than 18 
months in com1nand of the Grand Fleet renders his opinion of 
pecul· ar value. His report is as follows : 
·'It is undoubtedly the case that the size of 1nodern ves~els is 
one of the factors which renders search at sea far 1nore difficult 
than in the days of smaller vessels. So far as I know, it has 
never been contended that it is· ne·cessary to re1nove every package 
of a ship's cargo to establish the· character and nature of her 
trade, etc.; but it 1nust be obvious that the larger the vessel and 
the greater the amount of cargo, the more difficult does exami-
nation at sea become, because more packages must be removed. 
"This difficulty is much enhanced by the practice of concealing. 
contraband in bales of hay an<l passengers' luggage, ca~ks, etc., : 
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and t his procedure, which has undoubtedly been carried out, neces-
sitate·s the actual re1noval of a good deal of cargo for examination 
in suspected cases.. This removal can not be carried out at sea, 
except in the very finest weather. 
"Further, in a large ship the greater bulk of the cargo ren-
ders it easier to conceal contraband, especially such valuable 
1nehUs as nickel, quantities of which can easily be stowed in 
places other than the holds of a large ship. 
"I entirely dispute· the contention, therefore, advanced in the 
Amelican note, that there is no difference between the search of 
a ship of 1,000 tons and one o.f 20,000 tons. I am sure that the 
fallacy of the state1nent must be apparent to anyone who has 
ever carried out such a search at sea. 
"There are other facts, however, which render it necessary to 
bring vessels into port for search. The• n1ost important is the 
manner in which t hose in con1mand of German submarines, in 
entire disregard o.f international law and of their own prize 
regulations, attack and sink merchant vessels on the high seas, 
neutral as well as British, without visiting the ship and therefore 
without any examination of the cargo. This procedure renders 
it unsafe for a neutral vessel which is being examined by officers 
from a British ship to r emain stopped" on the high seas, and 
it is therefore in the interests o.f the neutrals themselves that the 
exan1ination should be· conducted in port. 
"The German practice of 1nisusing United States passports· in 
order to· procure a safe conduct for military persons and agents of 
enemy nationality n1akes it necessary to examine closely all sus-
pected persons, and to do this effectively necessitates bringing the 
ship into harbor." 
7. Sir John Jellicoe goes on to say: 
"The difference between the British and the German procedure 
is that we have acted in the way which causes the least dis-
comfort to neutrals. I nstead of sinking neutral ships engaged in 
trade with the enetny, as the Germans have done in so 1nany 
cases in direct contravention of article 113 of their own Naval 
Priz.e Regulations, 1909, in which it is laid down that the com-
nlander is only justified in destroying a neutral ship which has 
been captured if-
( ar) She is liable to conde1nnation, and 
(b) The bringing in might expose the wal"ship to danger 
or imperil the success of the 'operations in which she 
is engaged a t the time-
've ,exmnine them, giving as· little inconvenience as modern naval 
conditions will allow, sending the·1n into port only when this 
bE!'c(nnes necessary. 
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' ' It must be ren1en1bered, however, that it is not the allies alone 
who send a percentage of neutral vessels into port for examina-
tion, for it is com1non knowledge that Gern1an naval vessels, as 
stated in paragraph 19 of the American note, ' seize and bring 
into German ports neutral vessels bound for Scandinavian and 
Danish ports.' 
"As cases in point, the interception by the Germans of the 
American oil-tankers Llama and Platttria in August last may be 
mentioned. Both were bound to America from Sweden and were 
taken into Swinen1unde for examination." 
8. The French Ministry of Mar :ne shares the views expressed 
by Sir J. ~Tellicoe on the question of search at sea, and bas added 
the following statement: 
"Naval practice, as it for1nerly existed, consisting in search-
ing ships on the high seas, a method banded down to rus by the 
old navy, is no longer adaptable to the conditions of navigat:on 
at the present day. Americans have anticipated its insufficiency 
and have foreseen the necessity of substituting some more effective 
metl10d. In the instructions issued by the A1nerican Navy Depart-
ment, under date of June 20, 1898, to the cruisers of the United 
States, the following order is found (clause 13) : 
" ' If the latter (the ship's appers) show contraband of war, the 
ship should be seized; if not, she should be set free unless by 
r·eason of strong grot~Ands tor suSJpioimt a further search ·should 
seem to be' requisite.' 
" Every ~ethod 1nust be modified having regard to the Inodifica-
tions of material which men have at their d.sposal, on condition 
that the method remains humane and civilized. 
"The French Admiralty considers that to-day a ship, in order 
to be searched, should be brought to a port whenever the state 
of the sea, the nature, weight, volume, and stowage of the suspect 
cargo, as well as the obscurity and lack of precision of the ship~s 
papers, render search at sea practically in1poss~ble or dangerous 
for the ship searched. 
"On the other hand, when the contrary circumstances exist, 
the search should be made at sea. 
"Bringing the ship into port is also necessary and justified 
when, the neutral vessel having entered the zone or vicinity 
of hostilities, (1) it is a question, in the interests of the neutral 
ship herself, of avoiding for the latter a series of stoppages 
and successive visits and of establishing once for all her innocent 
character and of permitting her thus to continue her voyage 
freely and without b~ing molested; and (2) the bell igerent, within 
his rights of legitimate defence, is entitled to exercise special 
vigilance over unknown ships which circulate in these waters." 
(Ibid, p. 121.) 
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Diplo1na:tic correspO'Jvdence on the " B ernisse " and the 
" Elve," 1~9'17 .-These. two small Dutch vessels while 
being taken into Kirkwall by British authority were 
torpedoed by German submarines. The Dutch authori-
ties maintained that the vessels' papers were in order 
and their cargoes innocent. The· Dutch minister in Lon-
don in a communication to the British foreign office in-
closing the detailed staternent said, October 26, 1917: 
3. In these circtnnstances all responsibility for dmnage re-
sulting fron1 the detention falls upon the British Government, 
independently of the cause which occasioned the loss.. This 
responsibility is all the 1nore unquestionable in view of the 
fact that " the British authorities knew· beforehand that the 
detention would bring about not only a loss of thne, but obliged 
the vessels to navigate the danger zone, \vhere they were ex-
posed to attacks by Gennan sub1narines. 
4. In pennitting vessels to be taken to British ports without 
accevting the responsibility ti1erefor in the above sense, the 
British ·Government \vould Inake it in1possible for Dutch vessels 
to continue to sail to ports of Powers' allied to Great Britain. 
5. The Queen's Govenunent, going by the above, think that 
they may expect your Excellency's Govern1nent to cmnpensate 
the shipping company concerned for the losses which they have 
suffered. (British Parlia1nentary Papers, Misc. No. 1 [1917-1918]. 
Ccl. 8909, p. 2.) 
In a reply fro1n the British foreign office, November 
16, 1917, there is expressed surprise that the protest and 
clain1 has not been made against the German Govern-
ment rather than against the British Government and it 
is presumed that this has not been done, and it is said : 
The situation, therefore, is that, in the opinion of the Nether-
lands Govern1nent, His 1\fajesty's Governn1ent are to be held re-
sponsible because, while they were perfonning the perfectly le-
gitimate act of sending a neutral vessel into port for examina-
tion, an act was committed by their enemies for which no justifi-
cation whatever is possible; and the German Government are 
apparently to be held blameless. The right of a belligerent to 
examine and search neutral vessels can not be questioned; the 
fact that in modern conditions such examination can not take 
place at sea can not be disputed, and the legality of sending such 
vessels into port for examination has been admjtted in practice 
/ 
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throughout the present war; but the Netherlands Government 
appear to consider that His l\iajesty's Government ought to 
abandon an established right, because their enemies have seen 
fit to adopt a course of action for which it is not suggested 
that any justification is to be found. 
4. A considerable portion of the enclosures in your note is occu-
pied with an atten1pt to prove that it was unnecessary, in the par-
ticular circumstances of this case, for these vessels to be sent into 
port. I do not think it necessary to go into this point, because, 
apart fro1n any question as to the possibility or desirability of 
discussing the circumstances: in which an admitted right might, 
in the discretion of the officers concerned, be waived, it is clear 
that had it not been for the utterly unjustifiable action of the 
German submarines, the sending in of these vessels would have 
caused no loss to the owners, except the slight delay caused 
by such diversion and exa1nination. The da1nage, in fact, suffered 
was directly caused by the illegal acts of the German sub-
marines; for the consequences of those illegal acts His Majesty's 
Government could not in any circumstances be responsible. 
5. Although it is not disputed that the German action in pro-
claiming vast tracts of sea to be a "barred zone" in which 
neutral vessels will he sunk without warning was. utterly illegal, 
to say nothing of its inhumanity, and although His Majesty's Gov-
erninent are of opinion that the neutral Governments affected 
should have taken such steps as were open to them to resist this 
German atte1npt to forbid all navigation within the area iL 
question, they have, in fact, as the Netherlands Government are 
aware, at some inconvenience to themselves, made arrangements 
whereby neutral vessels whose owners are prepared to accept 
certain reasonable conditions 1nay be examined at certain points 
outside the "danger zone." The vessels now in question had 
ntade no attempt to obtain these facilities, but preferred to run 
such risks as might be incurred, should it be decided that they 
n1ust be examined in a British port. 
6. In these circumstances His l\1ajesty's Government must de-
cline to accept any liability of any sort or kind for loss which 
may be caused to neutralS' by the illegal action of the German 
Government. I am constrained to say that the action of a neutral 
nation, which apparently accepts without protest the proceedings 
o.f German submarines in such a case as this, and confines its 
efforts to presenting claims for the loss caused by such action 
to His l\iajesty's Government, is, in their opinion, inconsistent 
with the obligations of neutrality. Indeed, it is, not easy to 
characterise ;';UCh action by a professedly friendly Power with due 
regard to the customary amenities of diplomatic correspondence. 
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I have only to add that if the owners of these two vessels are 
still of opinion that they have a justifiable claim against His 
lVIajesty's Govern1nent, it is open to them to present it in the 
Prize Court; but if such a claim is made, it will be strenuously 
resisted by the representatives of the Crown. 
I have, etc. 
A. J. BALFOUR. 
(Ibid. p. 11.) 
The Dutch m.inister replied on December 17, 1917, 
stating that they "\vere unable to recognize the la·wfulness 
of the British action in taking the vessels to Kirkwall, 
but-
On the contrary, they con ~ est the point of view held by the 
British Government that a belligerent has the right in any cir" 
ctunstances to bring into port a neutral vessel, and that if they 
do not avail [henlselves of this right it is only due to good will on 
their part. In the opinion of the Netherlands Government, the 
right of bringing a vessel into port is inad1nissible where, as in 
the case of the vessels Elve and B ernis·se, the ships' papers, as 
well as the circumstances in which the vessels are sailing, prove 
distinctly that there is no question of transport of contraband. 
The British Govern1nent plead that, had it not been for their 
illegal destruction by the Germans, the fact of bringing the vessels 
into port-even if it were contrary to law-would not haye caused 
any damage to their owners beyond loss of time. Now, putting 
aside whatever value this argument might have had in other 
circumstances, it is clear that it can no~ be taken into considera-
tion in the present case, seeing that the British warships were 
aware of the dangers to which the Dutch vessels w·ere exposed by 
the fact of their being brough~ through the danger zone. As the 
British forces c01npelled them, nevertheless, to cross this zone, 
the British Government can not, in the opinion of the Nether-
lands Government, decline responsibility for the damages incurred. 
English as well as An1erican prize law admits in a case of 
illegal capJ ure the responsibility of the captor for any loss sus-
tained frmn any cause whatever, even that due to force majeure 
or to hazard. 
The Queen's Government consider that a belligerent should, a 
fortiorz1, be held responsible in the ca~e of illegal capture for any 
loss which they might have foreseen. 
The Netherlands Government, for the reasons set forth aboYe, 
are unable to waive their claim for compensation on behalf of the 
parties interested in the· vessels Elv~e and Bernissc. 1.\;ly Govern-
ment will not r·efer to the remarks contained in paragr.aph 6 of 
DECISION ON " BERNISSE ~' AND "ELVE" ~.l) 
your Excellency's note ; they think these r;mssages, as well as the 
unusual tone of this note, should be attributed to an interpleta-
tion which is clearly erroneous fron1 the Netherlands pohit df 
\ ~ I 
view. (Ibid. p. 12.) · · 
The Britjsh note o:f December 31, 1917, ackno·wledgecl 
the Dutch note and reaffirmed the British position inqi-
eating that the prize court was open to the clai1nants. 
The considerations advanced in your note have received the at-
tentive consideration of His Majesty~s Government, but they do 
not .affect the essential element in the ease, which is that the ves- I 
sels in question, having been respectively sunk and damaged by 
the admittedly illegal action of German submarines, the Nethel·-
lands Government proceed to present a claim to His lVlajesty's 
Gove.rnment and not to the German GoYe1·nn1ent, thus seeking· to 
make His Majesty's Govern1nent responsibJ e for the illegal action 
of their enemies, while taking no steps to obtain eompens.ation 
from the latter. 
3. His Majesty's Government can in the circumstances only re-
peat that they are unable to entertain a ny claim of this 1iature, 
which it is, however, open to the clailnants, as already observed, 
to make in the Prize Court, should they thi nk fit to do so. . 1 
I have, etc. 
A. J. BALFOUR. 
(Ibid. p. 14.) 
0 ourt decision on the " B erniss1e " and th.e " Elve," 
1920.-ln this case two small neutral vessels were orclerecl 
; 
to proceed to Kirkwall. There were placed on board 
each vessel a British officer and some 1nen. The counsel 
:for the vessel argued that the're 'vas not good grouncl \:for 
sending the vessels in and that though there 'vas ·no 
question as to the right to· visit and search there was " no 
right to send the vessels to Kirkwall :for examination " 
and that there must be a cause for suspicion before , a 
vessel can be sent into a port. The counsel :for the cap,tor 
argued that: i 
It was impossible, having regard t o the Gennan submarine 
peril, to examine any vessel, however small, at sea., and the naval 
authorities were bound to send all vessels into port for search. 
(1923 N. W. C. Int. La\v Decisions, p. 123.) 
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and that the sending in was merely a prolongation of the 
right of visit and search. The president of the court 
did not rest his decision on this ground but said that: 
It is therefore necessary to consider whether there was any 
l'easonable cause for putting the vessels in charge of a British 
officer and crew, and taking then1 into Kirkwall. In my opinion 
this depends upon the question ·whether in the circumsta11ces the 
absence of what is called a green clearance formed such a justi-
fication. 'Vider questions were argued during the case involving 
the whole question of the rights of a belligerent to send a vessel 
into vort for examination instead of examining her at sea, as was 
the practice in forn1er tin1es. I do not think this case raises that 
question, for I am satisfied upon the evidence that the officer who 
stopped the vessels was satisfied that there was nothing connected 
'vith the papers, or the cargoes of the vessels, which required 
further search to be 1nade, and that no one considered that there 
was any reason,able ground for detaining the vessels any longer, 
or l;lending them in for examination, e~cept the absence of the 
so-called green clearance. ( [1920] P. 1; see also 1923 N. ,V. C. 
Int. Law Decisions, p. 121.) 
After revievving the evidence i:ri detail, the president 
said: 
I ' an1 therefore of opinion that the absence of a green clearance 
afforded no reasonable geound for sending these vessels to Kirk-
wall, and as no other reasonable ground was suggested I think 
there n1ust be a decree of restitution with costs. I do not think 
there is any ambiguity qr difficulty in the terms of the order in 
council and that it clearly did not apply to this case. (Ibid.) 
British procedrure, 1914-1918.-There 'vere ne'v meth-
ods introduced' by belligerents in order to determine the 
character o:f neutral trade during the "\Vorld "\Var. Mr. 
J. A. Salter, chair1nan of the allied transport executive, 
stated: 
I:rinnedia tely on the outbreak of war an Examination Service 
was established at I(irlnvall, the Downs, Port Said and Gibraltar, 
and the North Sea between the Orkneys and Norway was pa-
trolled. 1\:Ierchant vessels were brought into port and examined 
,.;. there, for boarding and search at sea were rendered dangerous 
by subn1arines, and officers afloat could not be kept adequately 
infonned of the intricate developments in policy. The Examining 
Officers in the ports acted under direct, and constantly more 
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stringent, orders from London as to the· vessels and cargoes which 
they were to seize or release. (Allied Shipping Control, J. A. 
Salter, p. 99.) 
Soon even this policy gave ·way to reprisals and to 
acts of interference on a scale not contemplated in any 
rules of maritime warfare. Mr. Salter further said: 
The neutral countries we·re therefore cornpelled to adopt inter-
nal rationing measures, so that the system of official control 
extended over almost the whole world-neutral and belligerent 
alike. The actual privations of some of the neutrals were 
indeed much more serious than those· in the Allied countries, no 
doubt partly because their export pro~ibitions were not suffi-
cient to prevent supplies slipping acrossi the border under the 
attraction of very high profits. (Ibid. p. 100.) 
Other methods of controlling neutral commerce were 
adopted. 
The first important method by which the economic resources 
of the Allies~ were us_ed to supplement mere chartering was to 
attach conditions to the supply of bunkers from bunker stations. 
Great Britain and her Allies controlled the 1nain sources of 
supply of bunker coal jn Europe and the Middle East, and the 
main bunker deposits on most of the great trade routes of the 
world. This provided a most effective instrument by which to 
induce neutral owners to allot their tonnage to work that was in 
the interests of the Allies, as the following short statement of the 
world's sources of supply and the principal coaling depots will 
show. 
A. Eur'Ope. The British Isles represented' practically the only 
source of supply during the war, the amount of Westphalian coal 
finding its way whether from Germany or Rotterdam being 
negligible. 
B. Afirio(J) a.n.d Australasia. Durban, South Australia, New 
Zealand, Newcastle (N. S. W.), and Freemantle. 
D. India. Calcutta. 
E. Fa.r East. North China and Japan. (Ibid. p. 104.) 
ReswnA.-Early regulations, ]egislation, and cases 
relating to seizing and bringing vessels to port implied 
that merchant vessels were to be under escort or that a 
prize cre.w was t~ be put on board. The bringing in 
v1as upon grounds of suspicion existing at the time of 
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the visit in hope that evidence to justify suspicion might 
subseqtiently be discovered in port. As J. A. Hall said: 
it seems perfectly clear that nothing in international law can 
justify diversion merely in the hope of discovering by subsequent 
s~arch evidence of contraband or other noxious trading. (The 
Law Qf: Naval Warfar~, 2d. ed., 1921, p. 267.) 
This position seems to be taken by the tribunal of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the case of the 
earthage. 
·; The.· exchange of 'notes between belligerent and neutral 
( ' P:O\ver~ and some of the decisions of prize courts during 
the ''Torld \tVar, 1914-1918, show attempts in the time 
of \Var to give ne"\v inter'pretations to accepted principles . 
. I\1any , c,ontentions ,aimed to extend to the doctrine of 
visit and search the right of a belligerent to interfere 
'vith a neutral. The extension of the practice of inter-
~~re_nce 'vith neutra1 "commerce was supported by some of 
the belligerents on. the ground of the ·exceptional nature 
of the vvar, the geographical r'elations of the belliger-
ents, the new methods of warfare, and other reasons. 
The United States 1in ·the note of October 21, 1915, re-
affirms the statement> in ·the American note of November 
i7, 1914, objecting, '.tp the bringing· in of vessels except 
on "evidence :found on. the ship under investigation and 
not upon circumstances ascertained :from external 
sources." · ; 
' ! . . • . . 
. · When reprisals .. were resorted to by the belligerents, the 
rights of neutral~ , a:nd their protests against unla vv:ful 
acts received scant attention. The belligerents prescribed 
or attempted to prescribe entirely new and very burden-
some rules for th~ conduct of commerce by neutrals and 
. I 
in so1ne instances practically put an end :for the time to 
such commerce. Neutral commerce was instructed to 
~ursue certain defined routes. The supply of bunkers 
'va~ conditioned on hertain pledges as to conduct. Goods 
were subjected to new inquiries and other restrictions 
were established. It was predicted that in the next war 
there would be no neutrals. 
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Vessels were routed or required to call at certain ports 
for inspection. This requirement was often stated, 'vith 
an argument that it -vvas for the convenience and safety 
of the neutral merchant vessel. It -vvas pointed out, on 
the other hand, that if each belligerent should maintain 
the right to route neutral vessels, such vessels might be 
instructed to go in opposite directions at the same time 
and might run the risks imposed whatever they might do. 
It 'vas not denied that a vessel of war might at its o'vn 
risk escort a neutral merchant vessel to port if it had 
ground to suspect the merchant vessel of acts 'vhich 
would make it liable to condemnation, or a prize cre-vv 
might be put on board under similar conditions for 
similar purposes. The action of the merchant vessel 
would then be under control of the belligerent and not 
merely under instructions of the belligerent. The neu-
tral merchant vessel could plead that it was acting under 
force 1najeure if the actual belligerent force was present 
or within range. A simple order from one belligerent 
even if accompanied by a threat as to consequences if not· 
carried out would not justify obedience in the opinion 
of the opposing belligerent. If the conditions were 
other,vise, neutral shipping would be in the impossible 
position of being under an obligation simultaneou~ly to 
carry out the orders of two opposing forces for it would 
not be inconceivable that such orders might be broadcast 
by radio to all neutral ships from the vessels of war of 
X andY. 
If there is a right of visit and search, and that is at 
the present time admitted, there must be conceded the 
opportunity and conditions making its exercise possible . 
. rrhis would imply the. right to take the visited vessel to 
smooth or safe water, or to escort it to such a place, or to 
retain the custody of the visited vessel till arrival of a 
force adequate to exercise visit and search. 
The sending of a vessel into port under a prize cre\v or 
escort presupposes a suspicion of liability to prize pro-
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ceedings based on information in possession of the visit-
ing vessel at the time. Suspicion that all vessels may be 
found liable is not sufficient ground for indiscriminately 
sending in of merchant vessels. 
SOLUTION 
• Under existing international law the movements o:f neu-
tral vessels on the high seas are subject to belligerent 
direction only when under belligerent control ;by a prize 
crew or escorting vessel and the liner has incurred no 
liability. 
